August 05, 2018

Last stop before Teutoburg

There is a town in Westphalia called Haltern am See.  It's in a quiet corner of the country, about an hour's drive east of the Dutch border, along the River Lippe which (as ESK) runs through that pretty farm country, roughly parallel to the industrial Ruhr a few miles south.

The Lippe near Haltern  (source:  Livius.org)

It was the Lippe that brought the Roman legion here in the year 11 BC.  Having secured their frontier on the Rhine, they began to plan for the conquest of the German lands on the east bank of the river.  To do so, they followed the Usual Procedure, starting with the establishment of readily defensible and supply-able military camps a few days' march into the hostile territories.  Over the next two decades this and several other sites would be the primary bases in the Roman campaign to pacify Westphalia, Saxony, and the other German territories west of the Elbe.

We know quite a lot about the camp at Haltern, partly because the site has been carefully excavated, and partly because all Roman camps (or castra) followed a common blueprint.


At Haltern they did place one gate (upper left) in a nonstandard place because the was the highest (and therefore most defensible) spot on that side of the camp.  The Romans dug a double-ditch around the area and then put up strong oak walls behind that.  German archaeologists have reconstructed a portion of the fortifications based on their findings and historical records:

Hello!  Let us introduce you to our system of government...

We know the men at Haltern were well-equipped, and ate and drank well.  Boats came up the river with wine and fish paste from Italy and France.  

Things were going so well that in 9 AD Augustus' man in the region, Publius Quinctilius Varus, took three legions east - XVII (probably based in Haltern), XVIII, and XIX - to project power into the interior.  In the greater scheme of things it wasn't a tough march - perhaps five or seven days with heavy equipment, auxiliaries, and camp followers.  

Gives me an idea for an ultramarathon...

Unfortunately for the Roman project in Magna Germania, there was a spot of trouble, by which I mean Varus' legions were ambushed by a confederation of tribes led by the traitor Arminius - in a forested swamp during a rainstorm - and utterly destroyed.  

In the following years the Romans came back to the region with a vengeance, and also an army estimated at 55,000-70,000 men.  Raids to the east recovered two of the lost eagles and made the reputation of Germanicus.  But, as we have come to learn in our own time, military victories do not assure political success.  In 17 AD Augustus' successor Tiberius decided it wasn't worth it.  He declared victory and recalled Germanicus, culminating in a triumphal procession that included Arminius' wife Thusnelda. 

You're not fooling anybody, you know

Wikipedia:  "Tacitus and Strabo cite her capture as evidence of both the firmness and restraint of Roman arms...  [However] contemporary historians evince discomfort with her display as evidence of Roman victory in Germania, as Arminius had resisted capture."

The fact of the matter was that everything east of the Rhine was a ruin, but it was a German ruin.  Planned Romanization projects in the region stopped.  Going forward Rome would manage the border states through political and financial influence, and keep the Legions on the safe side of the river.

This marked the end of Roman expansion in Northern Europe.  I suspect that one reason for this was that the Romans' primary political tool was fear.  In every conflict up until this point they had emerged victorious.  But the Germans now knew - and so did everyone else in Northern Europe - that you could fight the Romans.  They were tough, but they were not gods.  The Empire's future gains would be in regions where this was not so well understood.

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