Doctrine

As I continue my Panzer General adventures, a few random points on doctrine.

For me the history of modern warfare begins with the German Operation Michael toward the end of World War I.

"In Operation Michael, 69 German divisions were massed against 32 British divisions, and in some places the British were outnumbered four to one... Artillery was massed in levels never before seen. For comparison, in 1915 at Loos, artillery pieces averaged one per 60 yards. In the 1918 Operation Michael, one gun was placed on average every 12 yards. Continuing this trend, the Soviets in World War II massed artillery one gun per every 3 yards. In contrast to earlier offensives, artillery bombardments were brief and shocking. The enemy artillery was first eliminated with shells and poison gas. Enemy headquarters, communication centers, and supply depots were targeted. Forward trenches were then devastated, machine gun posts being prime targets. Trenches of the Battle Zone were then bombarded...

During Operation Michael, the British massed 30% of their troops on the front line. Instead of the desired effect of stopping the attack with overwhelming firepower, the troops were annihilated by artillery fire. In the sector of the XVIII Corps, only 50 of 10,000 front line troops survived the bombardment and subsequent attack.

The Germans achieved a stunningly easy breakthrough, quickly recapturing most of the land the British had won at the infamous Battle of the Somme in 1916 (British Day #1 casualties in that battle: 58,000). But, lacking mechanized infantry and good logistical support, the Germans couldn't follow through. The Australians came up and plugged the gap, and that was that.

This may seem long ago and far away, but when the Croatians ran the Serbs out of the Krajina they were employing very similar tactics, taught by U.S. advisors.

The specific principles the Croats were using were known as AirLand, and were first officially employed in the Gulf War.

But the the first and leading U.S. exponent of the AirLand doctrine was Major General John S. Wood, who commanded the 4th Armored Division. As every schoolboy knows, the 4th Armored was the pointy end of Patton's stick (<-- this is a cool link), leading Operation Cobra (the breakout from St. Lo), running amok through the German rear areas, and later liberating Bastogne as an encore.

And yet, AirLand was not the dominant mode of operational thought in the U.S. Army until after Vietnam. Even in World War II, Patton and Wood reported to men steeped in General Grant's style of war - pin the enemy down, and bleed him to death (ok, this is an unfair characterization because Grant well understood the importance of mobility, and chose a strategy of attrition because it played to his strength and Lee's weakness).

Now Grant is making a comeback. Even though AirLand is the new black, the current U.S. strategy in Iraq is better explained by principles of attrition rather than maneuver. You see, the problem with AirLand is that, while astonishingly successful at destroying a relatively immobile enemy in a set-piece battle, it is of relatively little use in a guerilla war, or in an urban setting ("not much fun at Stalingrad..."). That's why Saddam Hussein planned the current war as he did - to avoid America's doctrinal preference.

Now we have the war Saddam Hussein wanted. But it is a war well-suited to old-school American doctrine. This fellow has the right idea: "The American way of war has, typically, been attritional, relying on the strengths of its industrial society to provide machines, personnel, firepower, mass, and technology.¹¹ Because its national strengths have matched the demands of what Martin van Creveld calls 'trinitarian wars,' the United States has been fairly successful.¹² Where it has been unable to bring these strengths to bear against its enemies, it has been relatively unsuccessful."

I'm still not thrilled about our chances, but things are looking up. Hussein was a disciple of Stalin, but he knew a little Mao, too. Those old-school communists understood that to win against a superior opponent (and that was practically all they faced in their early days) you have to survive, decentralize, wear down the enemy, and above all, win the political battle.

The events of the past few weeks seem to have woken the Bushies up and made them realize that Hammes is right - from here on in the main event is a political one (props to the Syrians for staging a huge counter-demonstration with Hezbollah to slow things down in Lebanon). There will still be plenty of casualties of course - the attritionists will have a field day. But in the end the war will be won or lost in the souls of a billion people in Europe and the middle east. (Good luck with that, Karen.)

And AirLand goes back in the box, waiting for the next shooting war against a real Army.