In a nutshell
By a fortunate coincidence, I received a letter from Dr. Kapital today. He is living in his beloved Austria:
Dear Front,
I hope this finds you well. I was sorry to hear that every executive at your leading banks must be punished with a special tax. I was particularly amused by the 'household income' means testing. Nothing could be more incriminating than the fact that a financial professional has a highly-compensated wife.
Down at the monthly von Hayek coffee klatch in Salzburg it became apparent to me that even well-read and literate observers may be confused about what has happened. Here is a brief outline of my views, which I hope will be of some interest. Of course everything is contingent and even the best analysis is a mere abstraction of reality. While the models economists use assume a great deal, they do not assume things like tumbrils and guillotines. You have been warned:
- The best summary on the preconditions of the crisis is Martin Wolf's recent book Fixing Global Finance. His columns in the Financial Times (latest example here) are among the few pockets of rational thought in the current environment. He observes that the world economy this decade was dominated by massive imbalances, mainly those between the U.S. and a few export-based economies (e.g., Japan, Germany, and China). These countries ran trade surpluses by policy, and the U.S., having no trade policy, took the other side of the trade. Abundant credit flowed to U.S. consumers, who did what U.S. consumers always do. When the U.S. consumer woke up broke one morning, a global economic crisis ensued.
- Milton Friedman once supposedly said (then denied saying) "we are all Keynesians now." Whether it was true then, it certainly is true today. Stimulus is needed. Strong technical economists on both left and right believe the stimulus passed so far is inadequate. And yet recent polls show Americans will not stand for more. If something does not change quickly there, the phrase "downgrade to schtupped" comes to mind.
- But don't worry, lots of countries are worse off than you, including all of Europe. Mr Krugman explains the Spanish case here.
- As for Asia, who knows? Singapore has stopped, Japanese exports have fallen off a cliff. Amusing isn't it, that the Chinese would like their money back? They remind me of a Madame whose best client has run up a huge tab, and now is having potency issues. It is hard to prioritize the questions: are you going to keep visiting here (we need your business)? are you going to pay us (we can sort of see why you wouldn't want to)? are you doing something to fix your problem (we might be partly responsible, but hope you don't notice)? Even harder to put them delicately.
- Once the crisis began, it exposed a massive failure of oversight. While Bernie Madoff and our friends at AIG have become emblematic, the fact is that the SEC was warned about Madoff many times and never did a serious investigation. And AIG operated as a giant unregulated hedge fund in plain sight, with the tacit endorsement of senior policy makers. Michael Lewis discusses the subsequent sheisssturm here.
- I do not agree with many of the things they say, but Akerlof and Shiller's new book is one of those things you must read, whether you want to or not. Fortunately it is well-organized and well-written. Unfortunately, it says much of the eventual recovery will depend on factors that are not easily controllable, such as crowd psychology.
In a sense, we are a canary in this business coal mine and should sing a song of warning as we expire. The number and value of derivative contracts outstanding in the world continues to mushroom and is now a multiple of what existed in 1998, the last time that financial chaos erupted.Well, too late now. Your best chance, and the world's, is that the causes of this crisis are seen aright by the national leadership and corrected. America once had very good financial regulation, and certainly could again. But I must note, your stock market was at 1,000 (S&P 500) on Election Day, and now hovers in the mid 700s. Government action so far has been too slow, too small, and only marginally well-aimed. Meanwhile, Rome burns. For now we have a triumph of experience over hope.
Our experience should be particularly sobering because we were a better-than-average candidate to exit gracefully. Gen Re was a relatively minor operator in the derivatives field. It has had the good fortune to unwind its supposedly liquid positions in a benign market, all the while free of financial or other pressures that might have forced it to conduct the liquidation in a less-than-efficient manner. Our accounting in the past was conventional and actually thought to be conservative. Additionally, we know of no bad behavior by anyone involved.
It could be a different story for others in the future. Imagine, if you will, one or more firms
(troubles often spread) with positions that are many multiples of ours attempting to liquidate in chaotic markets and under extreme, and well-publicized, pressures. This is a scenario to which much attention should be given now rather than after the fact. The time to have considered – and improved – the reliability of New Orleans’ levees was before Katrina.
There are reasons to think things will get better. Bernanke appears capable (this 60 Minutes interview is worthwhile), Krugman's star is rising, and stocks are the cheapest they have been in decades (ceterus paribus, lower prices --> higher expected returns). If you are looking to put your spare cash to work in the market (and why not?), this book (and the accompanying website) would be a good place start.
Best regards,
Doktor Kapital
PS - It is good to see Obama leaving Duke out of his Final Four. They suck.
9 Comments:
I would like to extend my thanks to Dr. Kapital for this cogent counsel- and it is from his cogent counsel, and some left over Marxism I found under the couch while looking for cheetos, that I was long expecting Capital to eat itself about now.
Who else could have guessed the real estate bubble might happen when Krugman was only writing about it every week for four years, hidden as it was deep inside the New York Times most read list.
But some nano econ bright notes: I went for a walk by the dozens of yacht dealerships on Lake Union last week- to my utter astonishment, all but one was still in business. The Seattle Sounders debut game was sold out. And while staff in art galleries are getting laid, I'm hearing that paintings are moving fairly well.
I also aver, without evidence, all the hot girls are Keynesians.
Thanks, Doc Kapital!
BTW, I read the column my Michael Lewis you linked to. I have been a big fan of his, until I read this:
Since the beginning of the crisis I’ve wondered why the government has found neither the will nor the way to attack the root of the problem -- the people who borrowed money to buy homes they shouldn’t have bought.
This is hogwash, and ironically I know better because I've read his articles on the topic.
When somebody buys a house, and they can't pay the loan, they lose the house, and perhaps their credit. Their mistakes have tangible consequences. When AGI executives and traders borrow money with AGI's AAA bond rating, and put it all on 22 Red, and lose, and put the world economy at risk, and lots of people lose their savings, their jobs, their healthcare, etc? They still get their "fuck you" money.
Michael Lewis: fuck you.
I think this gets to the crux of the nub. Capitalism as such is something other than a theory of market behavior- it's an rather vicious ideology that props up a culture of privilege- one in a series of such ideologies which includes all authoritarian forms of social organization. The essence of such cultures is the labored, intellectualized defense of the entitlement of the privilege, and the presumption of the inferiority of those who are not privileged.
That's the line Lewis crossed here. It was ludicrous to blame the people who were conned into mortgages as the result of massive institutional efforts- and tiny fraction of the problem by any sober account. It's like reading those convoluted defenses of Stalin among communist intellectuals of another era.
I don't recall Aunt Martha insisting that AIG base complex financial instruments on whether she was going to make her $780 monthly house payment in a historically vastly inflated market, so she could have that crazy dream of, you know, living in a house.
The driving down of real American wages through policy while hyping a consumer culture into overdrive- now who did that?
And I've said it for many years- I have no real problem with market economies. What I have is a big problem with is any ideology that twists and turns and tortures the world with actions and policies to the defense of its own class privileges and the destruction of others.
Which is why we praise Dr. Kapital loudly. He really is doing yeoman work, swimming upstream against an ideology that destabilizes thriving markets, and wrecks happy human lives, with its own idolatry of remorselessness.
Dr. Kapital tweeted this to me just now:
There is smart capitalism and dumb capitalism. An important clue is that the world economy has functioned reasonably well for several hundred years without the extensive use of illiquid, non-transparent, undisclosed off-balance sheet derivatives that are not well-understood even by those who own them.
That there was a credit bubble is not shocking - anyone familiar with the balance of payments situation could see massive capital inflows to the U.S. The only question was how these would enter the real economy. Used to finance potentially beneficial public works projects (as Summers now proposes), they might have been innocuous or even good. But they were used to finance homes, which were, in turn, used to finance consumption far beyond the earning power of those who were doing the consuming.
For me the absolutely astonishing thing is this: even very sophisticated analysts have trouble valuing adjustable rate mortgages.
An accurate valuation would rest on:
1) A superior long-term interest rate forecast,
2) An accurate estimate of the probability of prepayment, and
3) An accurate judgment as to the creditworthiness of the borrower.
It is not easy (maybe not even possible) to develop this information for ONE mortgage.
If the guy selling the deal doesn't know what it's worth, how can there be informed consent by the borrower?
To then bundle thousands of these vehicles together, and then place numerous illiquid side bets on them is simply insane.
A gentleman from an important regulator recently told me that the mess was so intractable that at one point in the crisis they couldn't figure out which firms were in trouble.
Capitalism has its uses, but it depends on clear price information and regulatory oversight, both of which have been in short supply.
We need some new words here: one for the study of the real world and theoretical behavior of capital in markets, and one for that particular ideology of capitalism which amounts to a sort of puritan religious belief that the fact of riches is evidence of the blessing and will of God.
This religion already has a cable channel, CNBC.
From my email to Michael Lewis:
"Since the beginning of the crisis I’ve wondered why the government has found neither the will nor the way to attack the root of the problem -- the people who borrowed money to buy homes they shouldn’t have bought."
Seriously? I think that's a load of eyewash.
Someone borrows money to buy a house, can't pay the loan, the lender forecloses. The borrower loses a house, gets a big haircut on the credit score and the lender loses the asset of the loan and gets an asset of a house. That side of the story is pretty transparent and self-correcting. You know this stuff.
A borrower who is stupid or greedy or feckless or just plain unlucky doesn't crash a financial system. For that, you need a team of professionals."
A bad memory from my FHLB days, shortly before our derivative instruments helped to bankrupt Orange County (and others):
SVP: "I'm told it can be hedged perfectly.
CSG: "Well, I can't follow the math. Can we walk through it together."
SVP: "I'm told it can be hedged perfectly.
Pangloss endeavored to comfort them under this affliction by affirming that things could not be otherwise that they were.
"For," said he, "all this is for the very best end, for if there is a volcano at Lisbon it could be in no other spot; and it is impossible but things should be as they are, for everything is for the best."
By the side of the preceptor sat a little man dressed in black, who was one of the familiars of the Inquisition. This person, taking him up with great complaisance, said, "Possibly, my good sir, you do not believe in original sin; for, if everything is best, there could have been no such thing as the fall or punishment of man."
"Your Excellency will pardon me," answered Pangloss, still more politely; "for the fall of man and the curse consequent thereupon necessarily entered into the system of the best of worlds."
"That is as much as to say, sir," rejoined the familiar, "you do not believe in free will."
"Your Excellency will be so good as to excuse me," said Pangloss, "free will is consistent with absolute necessity; for it was necessary we should be free, for in that the will-"
Pangloss was in the midst of his proposition, when the familiar beckoned to his attendant to help him to a glass of port wine.
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