Seize Diebold Software and Assets
The Diebold voting machine problems are too serious to allow elections without immediate, independent review. The software needs to be seized, inspected and tested.
A video of Princeton researcher Felten hijacking the Diebold system is here.
This might be done with civil or criminal lawsuits instituted by state attorneys general against Diebold: reveal everything regarding these machines or face seizure of assets.
Unlikely to happen on the federal level, states may be able to take legal action individually. Democracy is at stake.
posted by JAB at 6:34 PM
4 Comments:
"The people who cast the votes decide nothing. The people who count the votes decide everything."
- Stalin
This video is a little over-reaching, I think. There are one weakness it exposes: the lack of sufficient phyisical security of the system. If the case is removed, the system should shut down and not restart without proper authentication. (There is a case alarm, and this should do more than beep.)
Also, there is a question that I suppose I need to go to the paper to get an answer for: what authentication mechanisms are used for the memory cards? If these are too weak (or don't exist, which would surprise me), then they need to be strengthened.
I think their "virus" scenario is a real stretch. If the machine is infected during a vote, it won't have an opportunity to infect a memory card (and therefore spread) until after the voting is completed. If the software upgrades (between elections) are being performed using memory cards that are not read-only, that's just stupid. (Again, it comes down to authentication of the memory card and its contents.)
I don't think the issue is the software on the Diebold machines, or even the physical security, because I think that you will never eliminate suspicion that the machines have been tampered with somewhere in the process, and that a "paper trail" is what is necessary for voters to have confidence that their votes where not secretly erased.
Now, I want to take to task the notion that electronic voting machines have been or are routinely comprimised: there is zero evidence of this. I examined the 2004 Ohio results in detail, and all of the most questionable results were in precincts using paper ballots. (You know, there are some old timers in Chicago, I bet, who would scoff at the idea that you needed to hack a computer to silently erase some votes.)
If we prepetuate the conspiracy theory that all the machines are rigged by the Republicans, and therefore your vote won't count, we are being tremendously irresponsible. I bet that the next time you do your GOTV you're going to hear your inferences echoed when trying to get somebody down to the polls.
Certainly, paper ballots, voice votes, and black and white rocks, can and have frequently been compromised. I believe, for example that a secure electronic system could be devised: an obvious example is the accuracy with which financial transactions are made, every day, with vastly greater amounts of data, and in some ways I share your impatience with the idea that voting security is too complex to accomplish.
Your point about overspreading the notion that your vote won't count is well taken - I can imagine a legion of stoners rationalizing this into never voting.
The essential question is whether the new electronic systems are particularly vulnerable to tampering. To place a partisan private company in this critical power position, and further, one that strongly resists independent inspection rather than welcomes it, is an open invitation to corruption. The Kennedy paper on Ohio at the minimum demonstrates at the least that local GOP officials intended to intimidate voters - the will is there, and the potential to erase any record of tampering with electronic ballots is great.
But I stand by my essential point - there is ample reason to get extremely aggressive about forcing Diebold to have their whole system independently inspected, in detail, at all locations, and in operation.
Since I can't speak to the technical objections, I post the Princeton paper for your perusal:
http://itpolicy.princeton.edu/voting/ts-paper.pdf
Well, just to scare you a bit more:
Apparently, standard 'utility keys', used for such diverse items as office furniture and hotel minibars, can be used to open any Diebold voting machine.
Post a Comment
<< Home