The Panzers Lose Their Mojo (Thrice)
To my knowledge, there were three occasions when well-equipped panzer divisions ran into infantry units unsupported by armor and were stopped cold.
The first one you know about - Bastogne. Special credit for being surrounded, though the paras were trained for that.
The second one is famous in Russia, unknown in the west - the defense by the 316th Rifle Division of Volokolamsk Highway <--(check out this link!!!). Probably the greatest achievement of the three because 1) they were the last speed bump before Moscow, and 2) they didn't have the kind of artillery and anti-tank capabilities of the Americans.
The tactics were unorthodox but worked well - they let recon units and relatively small German forces move forward, but any time the Germans tried to move down the roads in force, they met ambushes. The Russians abandoned the concept of a "line" creating instead pockets of resistance and harassment. This map shows units being hit, retreating, reforming, and renewing resistance 3 or 4 times.
The third, the battle for Hill #314, should be famous in the States but isn't. Two months after the Normandy landings, Hitler ordered a major armored assault led by 1st SS Panzer (the "A" team of the blitzkrieg) with the goal of driving to the beaches. Three panzer divisions hit one ordinary American infantry division (the 30th), and basically got nowhere. Hill #314, held by one battalion of infantry, was in the middle of it. They held the position by not panicking, and (in true American style), calling in gobs of artillery. The greatest threat to their survival was the batteries on their radiophones running down.
The author of the piece linked above was writing in 1958, but he could be talking about Vietnam or Iraq: "Portent of the future?? Small units, disorganized, separated and isolated by surprise attack, can fight and can win against superior numbers, despite the absence of a well defined front line. The key factor is superior leadership, for men fight no better than their leaders. The determining factor is, in the final analysis -'plain old fashioned guts'!!"
posted by Anonymous at 11:27 PM
1 Comments:
Forgive me if you mentioned it-the classic limit on German tanks was their small numbers: excellent but incredibly expensive beasts. Our tanks were terrible, but there were zillions of them.
In terms of occupation, a military act indistinguishable from a political one, huge investments in small numbers of supremely lethal units and machines is a recipe for oppression. The military force is overemphasized because they are undeniably power, but only in the military sense.
By nature this underestimates the value of cooperation, institution-building , and political sensitivity. Without large numbers o f well-trained troops making what is essentially a cultural case for cooperation, the instinct of commanders will be to rely on technologically driven force. This is a central reason for Rumsfeld's, or say Mcnamara's, strategic failure, and the right-wing's innate stupidity: a cement-brained inability to seriously consider other cultural motivations. This is a fatal weakness in any war where you expect more out of the final result than killing every opponent.
The more an occupation's success depends on force, force will be used to oppose it. (West Bank, anyone?) When force fails, the options reduce to withdrawal or overwhelming destruction.
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